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CONCERNING CATSKILL: MISSED OPPORTUNITY,
BROKEN PRECEDENT AND THE PLIGHT OF
AMERICAN WATERS
CHASE COREY*
ABSTRACT
As society progresses and the population grows, uninhibited and
unregulated pollution has become a pressing dilemma for current and
future generations. Whether it is plastic on the beaches, oil in the oceans,
or smog in the air, modern citizens of the Earth face a daily onslaught of
visible consequences from the actions of polluters. But what about the not
so visible consequences? Every day there is pollution occurring at a microscopic level, yet many are unaware of its presence. This infinitesimal issue
is nutrient pollution, and despite its diminutive cause, it is deeply affecting
one of the world’s most vital resources: water. With the Second Circuit’s
reversal of the Catskill Mountains decision and the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, the chance to kill a nutrient-pollution-enabling EPA rule
may have slipped through America’s fingers for the foreseeable future.
INTRODUCTION
What is thick, green, and causes side effects including rashes,
illness, respiratory problems, and neurological issues?1 If you guessed
algae, then you have probably already heard of the outbreaks that have
plagued the United States for years; fouling bodies of water throughout
the country with startling frequency.2 Although the recent increase in
algal outbreaks can be attributed to a variety of factors, the main culprit
according to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is nutrient
*
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and encouragement. I would also like to thank the Environmental Law and Policy Review
for the opportunity to share my writing, as well as the editorial assistance that comes along
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in the creation of this Note, and I hope that it is as enjoyable to read as it was to write.
1
Nutrient Pollution, The Effects: Human Health, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpol
lution/effects-human-health [https://perma.cc/TCB6-JQBG] (last updated Apr. 15, 2019).
2
Map of Reported Algae Blooms 2010–Present, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, https://www
.ewg.org/interactive-maps/2019_algal_blooms/map/ [https://perma.cc/W258-D6QM] (last
visited Dec. 3, 2019).
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pollution from human activity.3 The National Ocean Service describes
nutrient pollution as a “process where too many nutrients, mainly nitrogen and phosphorus, are added to bodies of water and can act like fertilizer, causing excessive growth of algae.”4 This form of pollution “makes
the [algae] problem worse, leading to more severe blooms that occur more
often.”5 Despite this, the EPA continues to endorse a theory that arguably exacerbates the nutrient pollution problem, and the agency remains
stalwart in its refusal to address any issues stemming from their support
of a potentially harmful train of thought.
The EPA’s rationale derives from the unitary waters theory, which
“is the EPA’s position that when Congress enacted the [Clean Water Act]
it intended that all waters within the borders of the United States be regulated as one big body of water.”6 Differing physical, chemical, and biological
integrities are irrelevant; by the logic of the theory, one could “transfer[ ]
dirty water from a city lagoon into a pristine mountain stream . . . [without adding] a toxic or pollutant to the stream.”7 The modern positions
both for and against the theory are best illustrated by analogy, and the
fictional situation that follows is an expanded version of the Eleventh
Circuit’s helpful explanation.8
A man stands in a room. To his left sits a bucket, containing four
marbles. To his right is another bucket, this one with nothing inside of it.
Directly in front of the man is a sign, with words that state “Do Not Add
Marbles to Buckets” in bold lettering. After considering the instruction
in front of him, the man removes two marbles from the bucket on his left.
He looks at the sign instructing him to not add marbles to buckets, and
proceeds to drop two marbles into the empty bucket on his right. Three
observers, after witnessing what has occurred, debate the disobedience of
the man; has he added marbles to buckets against the instruction of the
sign? The first observer contends that the man has disobeyed instructions.
Clearly an addition has occurred, because there are now two marbles in
a bucket where there had been none before. The second observer disagrees,
3

Nutrient Pollution, Sources and Solutions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution
/sources-and-solutions [https://perma.cc/T73Q-4HP4] (last updated Feb. 4, 2019).
4
What is nutrient pollution?, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts
/nutpollution.html [https://perma.cc/6TMZ-LD7B] (last updated Oct. 22, 2019).
5
Nutrient Pollution, Harmful Algal Blooms, EPA, https://www.epa .gov/nutrientpollution
/harmful-algal-blooms [https://perma.cc/2CWY-KMG6] (last updated July 17, 2019).
6
Heidi Hande, Is the EPA’s Unitary Waters Theory All Wet?, 6 WYO. L. REV. 401, 403 (2006).
7
Id. at 404.
8
Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1228 (11th Cir.
2009).
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and believes that no addition has occurred: there were four marbles in
buckets before, and there are four marbles in buckets now. The third
observer notes the rationality of both positions, but refuses to explicitly
state whether or not there has been an addition of marbles to buckets.
This analogy and its cast of characters should ring a bell to those
familiar with the unitary waters theory and harken them to the relevant
debate presented by the vignette: did the man add marbles to buckets?
After revealing who the characters represent, the real debate becomes
clearer. The buckets represent the waters of the United States; the marbles
symbolize pollutants. The sign forbidding the addition of marbles also
plays a role by representing government regulation, specifically the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”). However, the most important characters for the purposes of this Note are the three observers. The first observer is representative of environmentalists, helplessly witnessing the addition of marbles
despite the sign’s instructions. The second observer is the EPA, arguably
employing semantics in order to claim that the man’s actions are not an
addition. The third observer represents the courts, focusing only on the
rationality of each argument, apparently without care for which side
presents the most environmentally effective approach.
This Note’s purpose is to present an argument as to why the denial of certiorari in Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v.
EPA (Catskill or Catskill Mountains), was not only a mistake but also a
missed opportunity to prevent the Water Transfers Rule from further
harming American waters. The Note will do so through legal and policy
arguments, exhibiting the potential doctrinal benefits of a reversal in
Catskill as well as the environmental effects an unbridled Water Transfers Rule could exacerbate. The Note will begin by tracing a modern
timeline of the unitary waters theory with the intent of showcasing the
path leading to the Catskill holding. It will then move into a general discussion of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, arguing that Catskill
was ripe for reconsideration. In its analysis of that argument, the Note
will discuss the problematic Chevron standard while weighing various
routes to certiorari that the Supreme Court could have utilized but failed
to consider. The Note will then provide two arguments the Court could
have rationally presented in order to reverse. The first argument will
utilize the legal landscape of agency deference to exhibit the necessity of
an alternative standard to Chevron, especially in fact-sensitive rule-making
that necessitates scientific analysis. The second argument is one of policy
and will examine the potential unintended consequences of the Catskill
holding via an illustration of the national environmental problem that
the Water Transfers Rule presents.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITARY WATERS THEORY

The EPA and other governmental entities are frequently in the
cross-hairs of environmental lawsuits due to their endorsement or support of various rules, and the Water Transfers Rule is no exception. The
rule’s story begins with the development of the unitary waters theory,
starting chronologically with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Council, Inc. (Chevron), a 1984 case that has factored heavily into the
development of modern agency rule-making.9 The theory’s story continues with post-Chevron courts free to consider the efficacy of the theory
in the absence of a promulgated rule, resulting in a pattern of rejection
by lower courts and a refusal to grant certiorari by the Supreme Court.10
This environmentally positive trajectory was directly altered by the
promulgation of the Water Transfers Rule, which interpreted the CWA’s
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System’s (“NPDES”) permitting process to explicitly exclude water transfers.11 This essentially codified the unitary waters theory and forced courts beholden to the Supreme
Court’s Chevron deference framework to align with the EPA viewpoint
expressed by the rule,12 no matter their opinion of its efficacy. Friends of
the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District (Friends of
the Everglades) exhibits judicial reluctance to accept the unitary waters
theory and lays the analytical groundwork for future Water Transfers
Rule consideration.13 The Catskill case, which consolidated nationwide
challenges to the much maligned EPA decree,14 solidified judicial acceptance of the rule, snatching away a much needed victory for environmental
protection. The complicated history of the Water Transfers Rule laid the
foundation for future Supreme Court consideration, and despite the denial
of certiorari,15 understanding the judicial path that eventually resulted
in Catskill is crucial. The cases preceding Catskill exhibit a legal web
that has only become more tangled in recent years, while also providing
9

E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2005).
10
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 109–10 (2004).
11
40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2008).
12
Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697, 33,700 (June 13, 2008) (codified at 40
C.F.R. § 122.3(i)).
13
Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1218.
14
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017).
15
Water Sector Win: U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Review Water Transfers Rule, NAT’L
ASS’N CLEAN WATER AGENCIES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nacwa.org/news-publications
/news-detail/2018/02/27/water-sector-win-u.s.-supreme-court-declines-to-review-water
-transfers-rule [https://perma.cc/CE8B-E46R].
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a helpful timeline of the Water Transfers Rule and the theory that drives
it. Both are essential to an examination of the Court’s missed opportunity in Catskill and help to exhibit the overall irrationality of the EPA
narrowing the CWA’s scope.
A.

Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council

The Chevron case is an incredibly important administrative law
decision. However, the finer details of its holding and factual background
are unnecessary at the moment. A general overview will suffice for the
purposes of this Note, but the importance of the Chevron decision to the
Friends of the Everglades and Catskill cases discussed below cannot be
understated.
Chevron involved a challenge to EPA regulations promulgated in
1981, which dealt with the interpretation of the terms in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.16 The case’s catalyst was an assertion that the promulgated regulations were contrary to law and that they involved an impermissible construction of the statutory terms found in the Clean Air Act
Amendments.17 The key portion of the Chevron case lies not in its facts
but in the analysis utilized by the Court to resolve the issue presented.
In holding that the EPA’s definition was a permissible construction of the statute, the Court set forth a two-part test for analyzing the
viability of an agency’s legislative interpretation.18 When confronted with
a challenge to an agency’s statutory construction, a court must ask two
questions: the first is whether or not Congress has directly spoken to the
issue.19 If a statute is ambiguous or does not speak to the issue, the court
must then ask the second question: whether the agency’s interpretation
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.20 This two-part inquiry has led to an interpretive framework known as Chevron deference,
an analysis that accords agencies and their rules great power within the
gaps left by statutory uncertainty. If Congress has not spoken directly to an
issue or if a statute is ambiguous, Chevron deference allows the agency
regulations to control provided they are not “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”21 The Chevron holding barred courts
16

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842–43.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 843.
21
Id. at 844.
17
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from rejecting an agency opinion despite its inefficacy, stating that “[w]hen
a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision . . . really
centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a
reasonable choice . . . the challenge must fail.”22 This incredibly low bar
for deference has greatly increased the difficulty of agency rule challenges
in the post-Chevron era, resulting in environmental groups facing an
uphill battle when met with the presence of a promulgated EPA regulation. In the absence of a promulgated rule, the challenger to an agency
interpretation has a far easier route to reversal, as seen in Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians v. South Florida Water Management (Miccosukee Tribe).23
B.

Miccosukee Tribe v. South Florida Water Management

In 1999, the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida alleged that
the pumping practices of the South Florida Water Management District
had resulted in an increase in nutrient pollution.24 The tribe stated that
the increased nutrient levels were causing “degradation not only in the
water quality but in plant materials, soils, animal habitat and biological
life,” as well as “long term and perhaps permanent damage to the Everglades system.”25 The claim focused on the NPDES program and whether
or not a permit was required for a pumping system that “merely passes
water between two parts . . . of United States water.”26
The pumping system in question collected ground water and rainwater runoff, then deposited it into the “C-11” canal; the canal’s companion
pumping station, “S-9,” pumped water from the canal into wetland habitats
in order to prevent flooding of populated areas around the C-11 basin.27
The tribe filed suit under the CWA, which prohibits the discharge of pollutants unless such discharge is done in compliance with the CWA.28 The
CWA defines discharge of a pollutant as “any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source,”29 and defines a point source
as “any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance . . . from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.”30
22

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
24
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 98-6056-CIV, 1999 WL
33494862, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1999).
25
Id.
26
Id. at *2.
27
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
28
See Miccosukee Tribe, 1999 WL 33494862, at *1.
29
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2012).
30
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
23
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In consideration of the NPDES permit issue, the Supreme Court
discussed whether or not the canal that water was being pumped out of
was a distinct body of water. This analysis drifted into a discussion of the
“unitary waters” approach, under which the S-9 pump station would not
need an NPDES permit in order to operate.31 The South Florida Water
Management District suggested that the Court adopt the “unitary waters” approach due to “a longstanding EPA view that the process of ‘transporting, impounding, and releasing navigable waters’ cannot constitute
an ‘addition’ of pollutants to ‘the waters of the United States.’ ”32 The Court
rejected this proposal, pointing out that the government had not “identif[ied] any administrative documents” espousing that position and citing
an amicus brief by former EPA officials, which stated that the agency
had once reached a directly contrary conclusion.33
The Court declined to interpret the unitary waters theory due to
a lack of evidence that the EPA actually believed it to be the best approach to the CWA.34 Instead, the Court remanded for interpretation by
the lower court as to whether or not the C-11 canal and the reservoir it
pumped into were distinct bodies of water, leaving the “unitary waters”
approach open on remand.35 This brief foray into the theory by the Supreme Court was a short-lived victory for environmental groups. The
Court’s refusal to address the unitary waters approach provided the EPA
with a window of time within which it was able to clarify its position and
solve the inadequacies posited by the Court, resulting in the eventual
promulgation of the Water Transfers Rule.
C.

The Water Transfers Rule

The Water Transfers Rule was initially catalyzed by the implementation of the CWA, “the principal federal law regulating water pollution
in the United States.”36 The Act’s primary goal is to “restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”37
The NPDES permitting program is one of the key portions of the CWA
and aims to provide clean water to America’s citizens via a permitting
31

See Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 106.
Id. at 107.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 109.
35
Id.
36
Chris Reagen, Comment, The Water Transfers Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens to
Undermine the Clean Water Act, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 311 (2011).
37
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
32

604

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 44:597

system for various water-related activities.38 The CWA has been assisting
with pollution regulation since its 1972 implementation,39 but the decades between then and now have not been free of conflict.
As the analogy described above illustrates,40 a disagreement has
arisen as to what constitutes an addition under the permitting system.
The CWA never defines the word “addition,”41 and this has resulted in
widespread confusion as to what the intent of the CWA actually was in
regard to the regulation of various sources of pollution. Due to this ambiguity, two interpretations of the CWA’s intent have reared their heads:
the unitary waters theory and the traditional approach.42 The unitary
waters theory opines that the navigable waters of the United States are
one large body of water; this results in an NPDES permit only being required “when a pollutant first enters the water from a point source . . .
[and not] when polluted water is transferred between bodies of water.”43
Alternatively, the traditional approach considers the waters of the United
States to be separate and would require an NPDES permit, not only for
point source discharges but also for water transfers between meaningfully distinct bodies of water.44
Prior to 2008, courts consistently chose to apply the traditional
approach over the typically maligned unitary waters theory.45 Recognizing this trend, the Bush-era EPA (which endorsed the unitary waters theory) promulgated the Water Transfers Rule, explicitly excluding water
transfers from regulation under the NPDES permitting program.46 The
Rule’s rationale section states that “water transfers convey one water of
the U.S. into another,” resulting in what is essentially a codification of
the unitary waters theory.47 This embrace of the theory has taken the
legs out from under the NPDES permitting system, opening “a regulatory
38

Reagen, supra note 36, at 311–15 (explaining the NPDES permitting program and the
CWA’s definition of addition).
39
Id. at 311.
40
See supra Introduction.
41
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
42
Reagen, supra note 36, at 314.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 314–15 (citing Priscillia de Muizon, Comment, “Meaningfully Distinct” Waters,
the Unitary Waters Theory, and the Clean Water Act: Miccosukee v. South Florida Water
Management District, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 417, 446–48 (2005)).
45
Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1217–18 (11th
Cir. 2009).
46
40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2008).
47
Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,702.
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hole in the CWA that jeopardizes the quality of the Nation’s waters.”48
The presence of a promulgated rule also had a noticeable effect on judicial
decisions related to the CWA, drastically shifting the weight of authority
from widespread endorsement of the traditional approach49 to reluctant
acceptance of the unitary waters theory.50
D.

Friends of the Everglades

The shift in judicial opinion of the Water Transfers Rule is best
presented by exploring a post-promulgation challenge to the South Florida
Water Management District’s pumping practices. Similar to the issue in
Miccosukee Tribe, the challenge in the Friends of the Everglades case
revolved around a system of canals.51 The canals had been dug to collect
rainwater and runoff from sugar cane fields and contained “a loathsome
concoction of chemical contaminants including nitrogen, phosphorous,
and un-ionized ammonia.”52 The water in these canals was then channeled
through pumping stations, which deposited the toxic liquid directly into
Lake Okeechobee at a rate of “more than 400,000 gallons per minute.”53
After describing the facts of the case, the court analyzed precedent
exhibiting the lack of support for the unitary waters theory.54 The court
set forth a litany of previous decisions rejecting the theory, stating that
it “has struck out in every court of appeals where it has come up to the
plate.”55 Despite this promising opening, the court noted the key change
that has occurred since the line of cases rejecting the unitary waters
theory: promulgation of the Water Transfers Rule.56 As the first court to
consider whether the EPA’s rule required Chevron deference,57 the Eleventh
Circuit launched into a lengthy statutory analysis. This led to a conclusion that the statute was indeed ambiguous and that the EPA’s reading
was a permissible interpretation of the statutory language.58 Following
48

Reagen, supra note 36, at 315.
See supra Section I.B.
50
See discussion infra Sections I.C, I.E.
51
Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.
2009).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1217–18.
55
Id. at 1217.
56
Id. at 1218.
57
Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1218.
58
Id. at 1227–28.
49
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Chevron’s mandate, the court deferred to the agency interpretation,
closing its opinion by stating that “until the EPA rescinds or Congress
overrides the regulation, we must give effect to it.”59
What appears to be a judicial call for help at the close of the opinion
remains unanswered by both the EPA and Congress, resulting in the first
judicial affirmation of the unitary waters theory from a court that admittedly feared the environmental implications of its own decision.60 The
Friends of the Everglades court has been decried for finding “ambiguity
where none exists,”61 but a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court in
November of 2010 solidified its finding of ambiguity and overall holding.62
Regardless of the validity of its reasoning, the opinion was landmark in its
application of Chevron deference to the Water Transfers Rule. As nationwide challenges to the rule itself began to pile up (eventually coalescing
in New York),63 those campaigning against the EPA’s promulgated regulation steeled themselves for the remainder of the war despite their
pivotal loss in the Friends of the Everglades battle.
E.

Catskill Mountains

After the codification of the Water Transfers Rule in 2008, multiple
parties filed rule challenges in various courts; cases filed in circuit courts
were consolidated in the Eleventh Circuit, and cases in district courts were
stayed pending the resolution of the Eleventh Circuit challenges.64 About
three years after the Friends of the Everglades decision, the Eleventh
Circuit dismissed the rule challenges on a jurisdictional issue, and the
stayed cases in district courts were allowed to proceed.65 Intervenorplaintiffs and intervenor-defendants swept in, eventually resulting in a
lengthy list of litigants seeking either to uphold or destroy the Water
Transfers Rule.66 The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
59

Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1226 (stating that “[t]hese horrible hypotheticals are frightening enough that we
might agree with the Friends of the Everglades that the unitary waters theory does not
comport with the broad, general goals of the Clean Water Act.”).
61
Patrick Parenteau & Laura Murphy, What a Long Strange Trip It’s Been: The Saga of
EPA’s Water Transfers Rule, 31 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 16, 18 (2016).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 506 (2d Cir.
2017).
66
Id.
60
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summary judgment, using Chevron’s step two to strike down the Water
Transfers Rule as an unreasonable interpretation of the CWA.67 This
environmental victory was unfortunately short-lived, as the defendants
appealed to the Second Circuit in an attempt to save the sinking EPA rule.
In a lengthy opinion, the Second Circuit reviewed the lower court’s
application of Chevron to the Water Transfers Rule, ultimately coming
to a devastating decision for environmental groups. After a section concluding that the CWA is ambiguous enough to require analysis under
Chevron’s step two, the court launched into an opinion that exhibited
reluctance to reach its inevitable holding. The court introduced its step
two analysis with a pointed statement about the efficacy of the Water
Transfers Rule, opining that “although we might prefer a different rule
more clearly guaranteed to reach the environmental concerns underlying
the Act, Chevron analysis requires us to recognize that our preference
does not matter.”68 The remaining pages of the opinion are replete with
similar statements showcasing the court’s attempt to buttress its holding
with alternative pollution prevention plans, suggestions that states utilize
other statutes to regulate water transfers, and the provision of various
ideas to help combat the “potentially negative water quality impacts of
water transfers.”69 A vigorous dissent provides a variety of arguments
against the majority’s rationale, but none are convincing enough to dissipate the impact of Chevron’s low bar.70 To the dismay of the plaintiffs,
the court’s deference to the EPA and ultimate reversal in the case reinstated the Water Transfers Rule.71 A final opportunity to take down the
destructive EPA regulation loomed large, as an abundance of briefs and
petitions were sent to the highest court in the country.
That opportunity never came to fruition, as the plaintiffs’ petition
to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari was
denied on February 26, 2018.72 The Catskill holding in its current form
enables the Water Transfers Rule to continue polluting the nation’s waters,
and the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the case potentially signals the
end of direct challenges to the rule itself. The case presented the perfect
67

Id.
Id. at 520.
69
Id. at 529–30.
70
Id. at 533–47.
71
Catskill, 846 F.3d at 533.
72
Docket Files, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket
/docketfiles/html/public/17-418.html [https://perma.cc/MM35-K39W] (last visited Dec. 3,
2019) [hereinafter Docket Files].
68
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opportunity for the Court to determine whether water transfers should be
subject to NPDES permitting requirements and to solve the long-standing
question of whether deference should be accorded to agency preference
in the absence of factual analysis. In denying certiorari, the Court leaves
in place a pollution-enabling rule while validating the unitary waters
theory. The theory could cripple the CWA, and the rule runs directly
contrary to the goals of the legislation it purports to align with. A discussion of the Court’s decision follows, providing a vehicle through which the
contradictory nature of the Water Transfers Rule can be exhibited, and
the Court’s erroneous denial of certiorari can be explored.
II.

THE COURT’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Centuries ago, James Madison prophetically described a modern
fear: “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.”73 Although Madison was likely unsure of exactly what form
this accumulation of powers would take, he foresaw the danger of vesting
so much responsibility within a single entity. In the post–New Deal era
of agency deference and Chevron balancing, Madison’s fear may have
come to pass, as an unelected and unaccountable litany of agencies make
crucial decisions without fear of repercussion.74 This “headless fourth
branch”75 of government could prove Madison correct, as “an administrative state of sprawling departments and agencies [governs] with increasing
autonomy and decreasing transparency.”76 These agencies and departments have grown exponentially,77 leading to more agency power and “a
larger practical impact on the lives of citizens than all the other branches
combined.”78 The overall constitutionality of the administrative state is
73

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
Ken Cuccinelli, The Bureaucracy—The Unaccountable Fourth Branch Of Government,
INV’R’S BUS. DAILY (July 13, 2016), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/bureaucracy-un
accountable-fourth-branch-government [https://perma.cc/H2VM-77DA].
75
Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 451 (2006).
76
Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May 24,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-govern
ment/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html?utm_term=.e89428c
26f3e [https://perma.cc/9VU4-X4RQ].
77
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-215, RECENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL CIVILIAN
EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION 6 (2014).
78
Turley, supra note 76.
74

2020]

CONCERNING CATSKILL

609

beyond the scope of this Note, but the constitutional implications play a key
role in Catskill’s argument for certiorari. The following section discusses
why the Court was wrong to deny certiorari in the Catskill case and presents a variety of pressing questions the Court had an opportunity to
answer. A subsequent section argues that the Court should have reversed
had they decided to review and will exhibit the necessity of reversal from
both an administrative law perspective and a policy perspective.
A.

An Argument for Certiorari: The Chevron Problem

Touted by some as the potential death of the Water Transfers
Rule, District Judge Kenneth Karas’s 2014 holding was a beacon of hope
for those who opposed the EPA’s controversial promulgation.79 When
Karas’s holding was reversed by the Second Circuit (over a vigorous dissent),80 legal minds immediately went to certiorari. In February of 2018,
after the emotional ups and downs of an arduous legal battle, environmental advocates knew their journey was at its close as they read two
words: petition denied.81 Given the conservative leanings of the Court
even prior to the confirmation of controversy-plagued Justice Kavanaugh,82
some may have seen this case as a vehicle to begin chipping away at an
oversized administrative state.83 Others saw the Catskill case for what
it was on the surface: a challenge to an EPA rule grounded in economic
policy rather than science.84 However, the true identity and opportunity
of Catskill lies somewhere in the middle, where it exists as not only a challenge to scientifically unsound Bush-era rule-making, but as an opportunity to reexamine one of the administrative state’s most powerful and
controversial weapons: Chevron deference.
79
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In SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, Justice Gorsuch hinted at the possibility of future reconsideration of agency deference, stating that “whether
Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day.”85
With the Court apparently “teeing up a debate on the future of Chevron,”86
the denial of Catskill’s petition for certiorari becomes ever more befuddling. Given the public’s belief in partisan division on the Court and an
increased number of split decisions in recent years,87 current Justices
should have jumped at the potential for a unanimous opinion that could
have served the partisan leanings of both sides in a constitutional fashion.
With Catskill, the opportunity was ripe to cater to the conservative goal
of decreasing agency power; on the left, Justices could have tempered the
inevitable blow to agencies, encouraging a level of restraint that may not
be present in a future overturning of Chevron.88
Aside from the bipartisan potential that Catskill presented, Chevron
deference in and of itself is concerning to some, especially in the realm
of scientifically delicate environmental rule-making. As discussed above,89
Chevron analysis consists of two steps, starting with a determination of
whether or not the statute in question is ambiguous.90 If this threshold
question is answered in the affirmative, the court then moves to step two:
whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.91 The first step of Chevron is very flexible, “creating a relatively large window for ambiguity”92 that results in various determinations
of what constitutes an unclear statute; there is no rule for what a court
could or could not find ambiguous.93 This broad brush of ambiguity is
further widened by an agency’s ability to essentially fill in the blanks when
a statute is silent on an issue.94 Some have observed that in practice, this
first step amounts to nothing: “if an agency’s construction of the statute
85
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is ‘contrary to clear congressional intent’ . . . then the agency’s construction is a fortiori not ‘based on a permissible construction of the statute.’ ”95
The apparent weakness of Chevron’s initial step could be deemed
negligible were the second prong strong enough to defend against the
shortcomings of the earlier analysis. However, the second step of Chevron’s
determination is arguably even weaker—and thus more dangerous—
than the first. Up to 2008, in cases where Chevron was invoked by the
court, agencies won deference 76.2 percent of the time, a noticeably higher
chance of victory than the agency win rate in non-Chevron cases, which
sat at 68.2 percent.96 This increased chance of agency deference correlates with the change Chevron’s holding worked within the EPA and the
alteration of the “dynamics inside agencies.”97 Administrative leadership
recognized the strength of Chevron and almost immediately began to
internally redefine the scope of agency power, which “opened up and
validated a policy-making dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the agency should adopt for policy reasons . . . .”98 This internal
shift from legitimate statutory interpretation to potential statutory circumvention has turned agencies into a quasi-Congress, formulating policy
and “filling any gap left, implicitly or explicitly,”99 by the legislative bodies.
This newfound power is exponentially increased by the interpretation of
Chevron within the lower courts, where the holding has been “read . . . as
a strong signal . . . that courts should not interfere with agency interpretations.”100 These deferential lower courts liberally apply Chevron, habitually defer to agencies, and routinely allow even legally shaky agency
interpretations to prevail.101
In this era of near-automatic lower court deference and increasing
concern over the growth of the administrative state, a split among courts
95
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invoking a controversial deference standard looked like a tantalizing opportunity. However, the Supreme Court (despite its now decidedly conservative majority) is unlikely to overturn Chevron outright.102 As recently
as June 2019, the Court refused to overturn an agency-strengthening
precedent known as Auer deference,103 a doctrine giving deference to an
agency’s reasonable interpretations of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations.104 Although Auer survived, it did not do so unscathed; the Court
placed new limitations and requirements on an agency seeking Auer deference,105 and this limiting approach could hint at Chevron’s possible fate.
“[T]he shift of votes [on the Court] suggests that the Court may begin to
apply a less robust form of Chevron deference,”106 even though a ruling
directly overturning the case is unlikely.107
With the weight of analysis leaning towards the current Court’s
majority possessing a desire to chip away at Chevron’s longstanding
foundation, and the recent reconsideration of another form of deference,
the denial of certiorari in Catskill continues to confuse.108 Catskill split
in the lower courts and invoked Chevron to support an agency rule with
little fact-finding behind it; the implementation of which potentially runs
manifestly contrary to the goals of the statute it derives from.109 With
Chevron potentially poised to take a significant blow from the legislative
branch110 at the time Catskill petitioned for certiorari, the case as described presented an ideal scenario for weakening an increasingly unpopular precedent. The Court should have granted certiorari, not only for the
greater environmental good that invalidating the Water Transfers Rule
could have provided, but also to catalyze the inevitable weakening Chevron
102
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must endure in order to preserve necessary checks on agency power. In
this era of policy for the sake of politics, it has become ever more important to rein in the administrative state during its attempts to legislate
in the absence of proper analysis. Catskill provided a vehicle within which
a variety of promising possibilities existed, and the Court’s mistake is the
country’s loss.
B.

An Argument for Reversal

Having made clear that the Court’s denial of certiorari was a
mistake on multiple levels,111 another step of analysis involves a look at
the Court’s options for reversal had it decided to review the case. In the
following sections, this Note will describe two routes to reversal that the
Court could have taken, both of which have beneficial implications far
beyond this lone case. First, the Court could have decided that Chevron’s
standard is not stringent enough and that a new standard must be created to rein in agency deference and require fact-finding beyond the
minimal level currently acceptable for wide-ranging, policy-altering agency
rules. Second, the Court had an opportunity to perform an analysis of the
ruling’s real-world impact and look to currently affected areas of the
United States in order to overturn the Water Transfers Rule as running
contrary to the intent of the CWA. Although the Court ultimately decided
that neither argument was pressing enough to warrant certiorari,112 a
deeper dive into the two potential paths showcases the need for change
in regard to agency deference and the environmental necessity of Water
Transfers Rule invalidation.
1.

Chevron’s Alternative

With the Supreme Court hinting at reanalysis113 and the legislative body nipping at its heels,114 Chevron’s stranglehold on the administrative sphere appears to be loosening.115 However, renewed criticism of
Chevron is blind to the consideration that the holding in its infancy was
111
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not the troubling grant of power it is infamous as today.116 Instead, it was
a relatively unremarkable case not viewed nor intended as a departure
from precedent.117 Judicial confusion and the elevation of its significance
by subsequent cases118 created what amounts to a “mandate for judicial
acquiescence”119 and resulted in a well-intentioned doctrine surviving long
enough to see itself become a villain. Chevron’s detriments (and benefits)
are too ingrained in our administrative consciousness to be kicked to the
curb completely; “at least some variant of Chevron deference [is] . . . essential to guide and assist courts from intruding too deeply into a policy
sphere for which they are ill-suited.”120 A potential answer lies in blending
Chevron deference with a more stringent standard, one with the ability
to give Chevron’s much maligned step two some desperately needed teeth.
The most appealing option for a new, blended analysis is the
incorporation of a “reasoned decision-making”121 requirement. Known as
the Chevron—State Farm conceptual framework,122 this combination of
analyses allows for statutory interpretation to be governed by Chevron
and leaves step one of the so called “Chevron Two Step” untouched.123
The change occurs at the second step of the analysis, where the framework would require agencies to provide “factual support and reasoned
explanation to support policy-based choices.”124 This would result in a
revival of judicial control over agency policy, ensuring that the agencies
themselves have engaged in reasoned decision-making while still allowing for “discretion and flexibility.”125 Requiring agencies to justify their
decisions with factual support prevents judicial acquiescence to agency
decisions that may be legally sufficient as a statutory interpretation yet
stem from nothing more than partisan policy.126
The importance of this framework’s application to the Catskill
case is immediately apparent. The district court in Catskill actually
116
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incorporated State Farm into its analysis of the Water Transfers Rule,127
resulting in the conclusion that the EPA’s promulgated rule was arbitrary
and capricious due to its failure to provide a reasoned explanation.128
Although the district court’s application of State Farm at Chevron’s step
two resulted in reversal,129 the Supreme Court had the ball teed up for a
marked improvement to broken precedent yet neglected to swing. Deeper
analysis further exhibits the necessity of some sort of factual standard
in agency decision-making. Completely missing from the EPA’s argument
is any “fact finding, critical analysis, [or] policy considerations.”130 The
EPA ignored “uniform federal circuit court precedent . . . [that] requires
a NPDES permit for the transfer of polluted water into a clean water
body.”131 The agency even explicitly stated that the Water Transfers Rule
was based on “legal interpretation rather than a scientific or factual
analysis of the costs or benefits of NPDES permitting.”132 There was no
weighing of costs or benefits, no balancing of policy considerations, no
research on environmental, health, or economic harms, and no scientific
analysis of water transfers.133 The EPA emphatically explained that the
Water Transfers Rule was based on nothing more than “Congress’s goal
of avoiding undue interference” with the states’ ability to regulate their
own water.134 This amounts to an admission that neither science nor
facts played a role in the EPA’s decision;135 in the era of Chevron, the
EPA was confident that its statutory analysis alone would suffice.136
If there ever was a prime example of the need for an incorporation
of State Farm’s “reasoned decision-making” requirement, Catskill certainly
fits the mold.137 The EPA’s blatant rejection of any sort of factual analysis138
127
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combined with its total reliance on statutory interpretation139 signals its
recognition of the significant advantage Chevron provides to agencies in
litigation. This “policymaking via rule-making” has coalesced with preference for legal analysis over factual analysis140 and created an EPA that
is clearly aware of its own power to alter policy without the hindrance of
science. It appears that Catskill may have merely been a test for what
the EPA could get away with in the absence of fact-finding. A new proposed rule141 picks up where the Water Transfers Rule left off, narrowing
the definition of “waters of the United States” and further chipping away
at the foundation of the CWA.142 Were it not for the Court’s denial of
certiorari, the district court’s incorporation of State Farm into its Chevron analysis would have provided a route to reversal that could have
weakened agency deference and protected American waters in the process. Instead, the Second Circuit’s decision stands, the Water Transfers
Rule survives, and an anemic standard lives on, requiring nothing more
than a hint of ambiguity in order to receive judicial affirmation.
2.

Catskill ’s Consequences

For all of its administrative implications, an important part of
Catskill is the potential effect it could have on the environment. As discussed in the introduction to this Note,143 nutrient pollution is a major
concern and results mainly from the actions of mankind.144 With Catskill’s
affirmation of the Water Transfers Rule, “loathsome concoction[s]” similar to the mixture described in Friends of the Everglades145 are now free
to flow into bodies of water such as “pristine mountain stream[s]”146
without being monitored or permitted by the NPDES permit program.
This flow of excess nutrients directly contributes to “degradation not only
in . . . water quality but in plant materials, soils, animal habitat and
139
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biological life.”147 The environmental concern that surrounds the Water
Transfers Rule speaks to another route to reversal that the Court could
have taken in Catskill without effecting a doctrinal change in agency
deference: holding that the rule implements policy that runs manifestly
contrary to the intent of the CWA.
NPDES permitting is “the most important component of the
[CWA]”148 and provides an essential method of policing water quality. By
hamstringing the ability of the NPDES program to require permits for
water transfers, the Water Transfers Rule facilitates the dumping of polluted water into pure water, and eliminates a common means of fighting
water quality degradation: lawsuits by concerned citizens.149 In the
absence of NPDES permits and potential citizen lawsuits, states are left
on their own to monitor water quality, a function that some have either
relied partially on the CWA to enforce or left entirely to the NPDES
permit program.150 Following the Water Transfers Rule’s validation,
“states may no longer rely upon the NPDES program in lieu of state
permits to regulate pure water transfers . . . severely limit[ing] an important tool available to concerned citizens and states.”151
In addition to its usefulness as a regulatory tool at the state level,
the NPDES program plays a crucial role in regulating nonpoint source
pollution152 on a national scale. Although the CWA does not require an
NPDES permit for nonpoint source pollution (despite the EPA’s recognition that nonpoint sources are “the most significant source of water
pollution overall in the country”)153 the Water Transfers Rule still has a
significant effect on water quality via its expansion of NPDES program
exemptions.154 The rule specifically exempts pure water transfers from
147
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the NPDES permitting requirement, opening a loophole in the CWA and
preventing the utilization of NPDES permitting to assist in limiting the
spread of nonpoint source pollution.155 “Requiring NPDES permits for
pure water transfers can limit the spread of pollutants already introduced by nonpoint sources,” but allowing the transfers to occur without
NPDES permit requirements “eliminates a federal check on nonpoint
source pollution.”156 A modicum of factual analysis prior to promulgating
the rule (or even a reanalysis following the district court’s invalidation)
could have prevented implementation of an overbroad exemption. This
would have allowed the NPDES program to continue to indirectly prevent the spread of nonpoint source pollution via water transfers and
enabled the CWA to function in the fashion that Congress intended.157
Had the Court decided to take the opportunity for reexamination
that Catskill offered, an invalidation of the Water Transfers Rule as
manifestly contrary to the goals of the CWA would not have been out of
the question. The CWA’s stated purpose is to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”158 With
nonpoint sources representing America’s largest source of pollution159
and affecting “more than 40 percent of all impaired waters,”160 an EPA
rule that prevents regulation of the worst water pollution source in the
nation certainly runs contrary to the CWA’s purpose of protecting American waters. The Water Transfers Rule is an impermissible interpretation
of the CWA that facilitates “the spread of nonpoint source pollution
through water transfers.”161 The Court had an opportunity to invalidate
this environmentally harmful rule due to its clearly negative impact on
the effectiveness of the CWA; it inexplicably refused to do so,162 and the
effects of that decision will certainly be exhibited in every body of water
no longer subject to the protections of the NPDES permitting program.
CONCLUSION
In Miccosukee Tribe, the Supreme Court chose to ignore the issue of
environmental justice, a concept that implies fair environmental treatment
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of all people, and fair enforcement of environmental law.163 The situation
in Miccosukee Tribe arguably violated this principle, forcing a single tribe
to shoulder the burden of an environmental injustice.164 The Court’s
refusal to reconsider Catskill comparatively violates the concept on a much
larger scale, subjecting the entirety of a nation to uninhibited water transfers pollution and the inevitable consequences that are inherent in the
practice. NPDES program regulation of water transfers “presents an
opportunity for innovative, cooperative, and practical permitting solutions,”165 while simultaneously preventing exacerbation of current water
quality issues and protecting from the dangers of nonpoint source pollution.
The Water Transfers Rule prevents challenges to practices that
have obvious environmental harms. The destruction of the Everglades
environment in Miccosukee Tribe,166 the pumping of polluted groundwater into rivers,167 and the nationwide nutrient pollution problem168 all
stem at least partially from water transfers, and with the Court’s silent
approval of the Water Transfers Rule, the practices and their resulting
problems will continue. With a clear path to certiorari and multiple
routes to reversal, the Court could have made a potentially groundbreaking environmental decision, one that would have greatly assisted in the
uphill battle for water quality. Instead, the Court declined review, emboldening the EPA in its piecemeal destruction of necessary environmental protections and breathing new life into a near-dead rule. Looking
forward, there always exists the possibility of new challenges to the
Water Transfers Rule or perhaps a fresh line of cases taking aim at the
EPA’s revised definition of “waters of the United States.”169 In other
words, there are still potential avenues to beneficial alterations in the
nation’s water policy, but their odds of success are questionable in the
aftermath of Catskill. Until alternate routes to change are tested, the
Water Transfers Rule will live on, eroding the CWA while two words
echo in the minds of those who believed Catskill could be their salvation:
certiorari denied.
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